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Economic Perspective 3 
NEW TECHNOLOGY AND STEEL PRODUCTION 
by David N F Bell, University of Stirling, 
Jeanette Findlay and Christine Oughton, 
University of Glasgow 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper is a response to a review of our report 
Steel Production in Scotland: Strategic 
Considerations for the 1990's. The report was 
commissioned by Strathclyde Regional Council at a 
time when British Steel (BS) was known to be 
reviewing its long term strategy for the 
production of steel plate. Then, as now, BS's 
plate production was concentrated at two sites, 
the Dalzell plate mill in Scotland and the 
Scunthorpe mill in England. It was well known 
that one of the main strategies under 
consideration by BS was the 'single plate mill 
strategy1, which as its name suggests, entails 
concentration of plate production at a single 
site. Our brief was to examine the economic case 
for maintaining, and investing in, plate 
production in Scotland. 
Subsequently, a review of our report written by J 
Love and J Stevens (LS) of Strathclyde University 
appeared in the Fraser of Allander Institute 
Quarterly Economic Commentary. The main 
conclusions of the LS review were as follows. 
First, although they agree with many of the main 
conclusions of our report, they argue that our 
evidence is insufficient to support these 
conclusions. In particular, they claim that: 
(i) in order to make a case for siting a single 
plate mill in Scotland, it is first necessary to 
justify steel production in Scotland; 
(ii) that we have explicitly ignored new 
technological developments which are on the 
horizon and which will have a significant effect 
on BS's strategy, and 
(iii) that such new technological developments 
favour the development of mini-mills at Hunterston 
rather than continued production in Lanarkshire. 
This article discusses each of these issues in 
turn. The following section deals with the charge 
of 'insufficient evidence'. Section three 
considers LS's claims about new technology and 
their suggestion that BS should invest in mini-
mills at Hunterston. Section four contains a 
summary and our main conclusions. Finally, an 
appendix to this paper lists a number of factual 
corrections to inaccurate and/or incorrect 
statements made in the LS review. 
2.1 Evidence/Analysis 
The most general criticism which LS make of the 
report is that a number of conclusions are not 
supported by sufficient evidence or analysis. 
However, in many of the instances to which they 
refer they neither disagree with the conclusion in 
question nor do they suggest in which way the 
supporting arguments or evidence are deficient. 
In consequence, it is not always clear precisely 
what would be required by way of evidence. Since 
they themselves agree with us on many of these 
conclusions, we must assume that LS are aware of 
stronger evidence and are intending to publish it 
at some stage. We would welcome such a 
publication. 
One example of this is their review of the section 
of our report which questioned the recent 
investment policy of BS. We suggested that it was 
hard to justify the policy of BS to under-invest 
in the Scottish plants on economic grounds. LS 
agreed with our supporting arguments on this 
issue. However they argue that 'these points in 
themselves are not sufficient to justify the above 
assertion' but they also state that 'there is a 
case to answer'. They then proceed to explain why 
it was correct for BS to develop the Port Talbot 
and Llanwern plants at the expense of Ravenscraig. 
Their argument can be summarised as follows: after 
the 'introduction in February 1980 of the EEC's 
86 
code on state aid....which dictated that 
investment subsidies would only be authorised on 
the basis of clear programmes to restructure and 
reduce capacity' BS decided to modernise the Welsh 
plants and reduce capacity elsewhere. In 
consequence, the Port Talbot strip mill was 
modernised, and this gave BS justification to 
'modernise and construct strip finishing and 
processing facilities in Wales' and presumably set 
in motion the dynamic which is now leading to 
centralisation of facilities in Wales and 
consequent marginalisation of the Scottish plants. 
LS go on to argue that "After the Port Talbot 
decision, we would strongly refute any suggestion 
that BSC's investments could not be vindicated on 
the basis of a fair appraisal..." (p 66). There 
are two points here. 
The first is that this line of argument does not 
address the central question of why BS took the 
decision at that time to concentrate investment in 
Wales and capacity reduction in Scotland. There 
is nothing in the LS review which answers that 
question and the geographical pattern of BS's past 
investment policy still remains unexplained. The 
second point concerns the role of investment 
appraisal. The Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission's 1988 report on the efficiency of the 
British Steel Corporation found that BSC's 
investment appraisal was 'not sufficiently 
systematic' and did not 'explore a range of 
options'. Moreover, the main recommendations 
contained in the report suggest that BSC should 
undertake more systematic investment appraisal. 
Since BS's investment programme was not based on 
systematic appraisal of all options it is 
difficult to know how LS, who have not presented 
any empirical evidence to support their claim, can 
conclude that BSC's investment programme would be 
'vindicated on the basis of a fair appraisal.' 
Of course, once investment is centralised at a 
particular site, that in itself might justify 
future investment in that site or, at least, might 
partially justify closures being concentrated in 
other sites. While we agree with LS when they 
state that the decision to upgrade the Welsh 
plants made the argument for Ravenscraig more 
difficult, it is not the case that this would be 
the only factor which should be considered in a 
systematic appraisal of investment projects. LS, 
in explaining the investment decision of BS, 
following the upgrading of Port Talbot argue that 
"..a similar throughput can be produced at lower 
unit cost by transferring production from 
Scotland." (p 66) 
The authors give no evidence for this assertion 
and indeed, BS are the only party able to confirm 
its veracity. However, BS have never released the 
necessary data to allow independent calculation of 
unit costs across the five sites. Further, it is 
clearly important to know not only which are the 
lowest cost sites, but by how much costs at these 
sites undercut those elsewhere. None of this 
information has ever been made available by BS. 
LS argue that our report failed to take account of 
the i mpend i ng costs of rebu i1d i ng coke ovens and 
relining blast furnaces at Ravenscraig (p. 66). 
While such renovation will indeed be necessary at 
Ravenscraig similar procedures will also have to 
be undertaken at Port Talbot and Llanwern at some 
point in the future. Which, if any, of these 
costs should be taken into account when 
considering plate-mill strategy depends on the 
time-horizon used to appraise the investment 
plans. As the horizon extends, technological 
uncertainty makes such calculations fraught with 
difficulty. Paradoxically, LS argue that 
developments in the technology of iron-making may 
render coke-ovens and blast-furnaces redundant. 
The second major conclusion which LS find 
unsupported in our report refers to our contention 
that BS shareholders would be best served by 
siting a single plate-mill in Scotland. LS accept 
that the Dalzell mill compares favourable with 
other European mills in terms of product range and 
quality. They accept the figures we give for the 
cost of upgrading the Dalzell mill. They accept 
that the cost of building a new mill at either 
Lackenby or Scunthorpe would be more expensive 
than a similar project at Ravenscraig. They 
accept that our refutation of the 'ageing mill' 
argument propagated by BS is 'both cogent and 
well-directed' (p 67). They raise a question of 
constraints placed upon the product range by the 
overland transport system. However, they fail to 
specify the nature of the constraints or to 
specify in which way this constraint is different 
from that faced in the alternative sites. We are 
therefore unable to address this point. Hence, 
LS, with one unspecified exception, accept all our 
major arguments. However, they do not accept our 
conclusion. The reason they give for this is that 
the '..plate mill decision has not been placed in 
its proper context" (p 67). They go on to say 
that 'a critical deficiency is that the report 
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fails to demonstrate conclusively that BS will 
need Ravenscraig's steel output' (p 67). This 
point will be dealt with in our response to the 
second main criticism which LS make of the report, 
namely, the arguments surrounding new technology. 
Finally, LS argue that our report does not show 
that a refurbishment of the Dalzell mill would be 
a better option than refurbishing the existing 
mill at Scunthorpe. They accept our assessment 
that the costs of refurbishment are less at 
Dalzell than at Scunthorpe, but they suggest that 
the Scunthorpe option would involve energy savings 
and lower transport costs. While the point about 
energy savings is valid - we refer to it in our 
report (p 23) - the point about lower transport 
costs is at the very least debatable. LS give no 
evidence whatsoever for this assertion and it is 
at odds with the fact that Scunthorpe is not a 
coastal site. Moreover, the port facilities at 
Immingham are the worst of all of BS's sites. For 
example, the draught at Immingham is less than 
half that of Hunterston, hence, the possibilities 
for exploiting economies of scale in shipping are 
significantly less than those at Ravenscraig. 
The contention that our report fails to give a 
proper comparison of costs between the possible 
options available is incorrect. On pages 22 to 26 
of our report we give a detailed assessment of all 
the costings for each option including the 
Scunthorpe option and we refer the reader to that 
section. We reject the assertions that we have 
assumed '..invalidly that a supply of slabs from 
nearby Ravenscraig will be costlessly available 
over the time horizon of the project1 (p. 70). At 
no point in our report have we said this nor did 
we assume it. It is not implicit in any of our 
conclusions and LS have not demonstrated that it 
is. The absolute cost of slabs coming from 
Ravenscraig is, in fact, irrelevant. What matters 
is the relative cost of slabs supplied from 
different steelworks to potential plate-mill 
sites. Even if such costs were found to be 
relatively high at Ravenscraig, which does not 
appear to be the case, it is our view that they 
would be outweighed by the higher capital costs 
associated with the other potential sites. 
2.2 Ravenscraig/Dalzell 
It is our view that the future of both Ravenscraig 
and Dalzell are closely linked. Thus the argument 
for siting a single plate-mill in Scotland is 
partially based on the existence of an adjacent 
source of high-quality slab. While at the same 
time, part of the argument for maintaining steel 
production in Scotland at Ravenscraig is dependent 
on the existence of a market for its output. At 
the moment around 25% of its output goes to 
Dalzell and presumably a larger proportion of its 
output would go to a single plate-mill which would 
require a larger input of slab. 
The attempt by LS to construct a case around the 
idea that you must first justify basic steel 
production in Scotland and only then can you start 
to make a case for siting a single plate-mill in 
Scotland does not seem to accord with what one 
would typically understand to be the policy of a 
large steel producer. Our understanding is that 
the main concern of BS is to make profits. 
Profits arise from the sale of the final product 
which in this case is steel plate. Integrated 
steel producers will seek a manufacturing process 
which makes products which meet customers' 
specification at lowest cost. 
In the long-run, this would imply that each part 
of the production process, from basic steel-making 
to rolling plate is fully efficient. However, 
long-run efficiency in the steel industry is a 
moving-target as technologies and cost conditions 
change. Further, companies are wary of fully 
committing themselves to wholly new production 
structures because of the enormous capital costs 
which they will incur. In practice, this means 
that production processes are developed in a 
piece-meal fashion and that producers are 
generally aiming at short-run rather than long-run 
profit maximisation. However, the time required 
to plan and build steel plants, implies that the 
long-run in the steel industry can be a very long 
time indeed and that investment policies tend to 
be based on existing plant configurations. It is 
very difficult for an established producer to 
start from a 'clean slate'. Instead, starting 
from a given capital configuration, a short-term 
profit maximising strategy may mean that some 
parts of the process are inefficient in the sense 
of being more costly than the most efficient 
alternative available. This does not justify the 
abandonment of the entire process unless its other 
components are also inefficient. Rather, it 
suggests a piecemeal approach where different 
parts of the process (eg basic steel-making) are 
replaced at different times. Thus the argument 
that somehow basic steel-making at Ravenscraig 
must be justified in isolation before any 
consideration is given to plate does not seem to 
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follow: BS undoubtedly takes into account its 
existing plant configuration when making new 
investment decisions. 
2.3 Demand Prospects 
LS correctly identify demand prospects as a key 
issue in making a case for continuation of 
production at Ravenscraig. In this respect they 
argue: 
"In our view, the Report fails to provide a 
sufficiently detailed discussion of the evolution 
of either UK steel demand or the demand for BS's 
product range." (p 67). 
In fact, the report contained a detailed summary 
of steel demand drawn from a number of sources ie 
ECSC, the Royal Bank and our own survey of steel 
users. The results from the latter are referred 
to at various points in the report, despite the 
statement by LS to the contrary. We have 
subsequently conducted a further survey of oil 
companies which shows that demand from the North 
Sea industry is buoyant. 
The demand forecasts given in the report are 
broken down into a number of sectors. The results 
are not explicitly given in terms of product 
range, however, forecasts for coated and quality 
steels are given and demand in terms of product 
range can be inferred from knowledge of the sector 
from which it emanates. For instance, it is 
mentioned in the section on demand from oil 
companies, that development expenditure figures 
are, for the most part, made up of demand for 
plate. 
In addition, it was not the remit of our study to 
look in detail at demand for all types of steel. 
As we have already mentioned we were asked to 
concentrate on plate. In the interests of 
conciseness and bearing in mind the time 
constraints we were working to we maintain that we 
presented sufficient evidence to support any 
conclusions which we drew. We would not, of 
course, argue that we presented the final word on 
the matter and would welcome any further work in 
this area. 
2.4 Imports/Import Substitution 
In relation to our discussion of possible areas of 
future demand, LS agree with the following points, 
"Demand prospects are favourable. The UK market 
has been subject to increasing import penetration 
and BS increasingly commands a smaller proportion 
of its home market. In recent years, the average 
value per tonne of UK imports has been greater 
than the average value per tonne of UK exports." 
(P 67) 
They go on to say 
"It is our contention that the researchers set out 
this data to imply that there are profitable 
markets both at home and abroad which BS could 
serve and thus increase the probability that it 
will require its Scottish operation. If this is 
the motive, then it is our view than (sic) further 
analysis is both needed and warranted to 
substantiate this point." (p 67). 
It was indeed our intention to make this 
implication. The very fact that foreign steel-
makers are making increasing inroads into the 
domestic market of one of the most efficient 
steel-producers in Europe indicates that BS could 
expand production to regain its market share. 
However, LS argue that BS is acting like a text-
book monopolist ie restricting output and keeping 
prices high. 
"..BS has recently announced price rises across 
much of the flat product range at a time of on-
going production pauses in Community markets. 
Whilst this will protect margins, it will 
facilitate greater import penetration and check 
the rate of export growth....This behaviour 
illustrates that the level of production can be 
manipulated by BS and that it is profit and not 
output which will be maximised in the coming 
decade, (p. 68) 
This interpretation is a distinct possibility and 
must be assessed together with BS's claims that it 
is restricting output because of insufficient 
demand at a viable price. 
3.1 The Impact of New Technology? 
Despite the fact that our report contained a 
fairly detailed discussion of best practice 
techniques in plate making and finishing. Love and 
Steven's argue that, 
"a second major criticism of the Glasgow study 
pertains to the short sighted and invalid 
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treatment of the technological issue." 
The LS review has little to say about plate making 
technology itself, but it argues that two upstream 
technological developments - thin slab casting and 
direct smelting - are relevant to the plate mill 
decision. Since LS do not provide a detailed 
assessment of the impact of these technologies on 
large integrated steel production we discuss the 
nature of these two technologies and their likely 
role in future steel production. 
3.1.1 Thin Slab Casting 
Thin slab (or near net shape) casting is a new 
type of continuous casting process that produces 
thin slabs around 2 inches thick. The advantage 
of this process is that thin slabs require less 
hot rolling to produce hot rolled coil. At 
present, six thin slab casters have been installed 
across the USA and Europe but only three of these 
are beyond the testing stage and none of them is 
producing their specified capacity. The leading 
company in this field is the Nucor Corporation 
based in the USA. The thin slab caster installed 
in Nucor's Crawfordshire site is based on the SMS 
process and has recently (June 1990) reached 
break-even production levels of 32,000 tonnes per 
month (around 400,000 tonnes per year (tpy)) out 
of its full potential capacity of 800,000 tpy. 
Nucor expect to reach specified production 
capacity of 660,000 tpy by December 1990. 
It can be seen that world-wide there have only 
been two months of profitable production based on 
thin slab casting and that the technology is very 
much in its infancy. Nevertheless, all the 
indications are that thin slab casting is a major 
technological process innovation that will 
eventually replace conventional casting, at least 
for the production of strip products. The 
important question is: how long will it take for 
the technology to diffuse from the mini-mills, who 
have a history of being the first to introduce new 
techniques, to large scale integrated plants? It 
is, of course, difficult to answer this question 
but some light can be shed on the issue by 
considering the diffusion time for conventional 
continuous casting. The first continuous casters 
were installed in the 1950's. By 1980 continuous 
casting accounted for about 25 per cent of world 
steel production and by 1990 the proportion of 
steel produced by continuous casting was 84.2 per 
cent in Europe, 93 per cent in Japan and about 60 
per cent world wide. Although, it might be 
reasonable to expect that the diffusion time of 
thin slab casting will be less than that of 
conventional continuous casting, LS's claim that 
this technology is relevant for BS's current plate 
mill decision rests on the assumption that the 
diffusion time for thin slab casting will be 
around twice as fast as that of conventional 
casting. However, notwithstanding this point, 
there are a number of other reasons that suggest 
that conventional continuous casting may be the 
leading production method for large scale 
producers for some time to come. These reasons 
fall under two main headings: (i) product range 
and quality and (ii) process innovations in 
conventional continuous casting. The LS review 
fails to give adequate consideration to these two 
points. 
As we have seen the introduction of thin slab 
casting has occurred in mini-mills where the 
casters are fed with steel produced in electric-
arc furnaces. At present the technology has not 
been developed to allow conventional steel making 
to provide the feed for thin slab casters. 
Moreover, thin slab casting has only been applied 
to the production of hot rolled strip products and 
its application to plate production has yet to 
occur, although it is obviously unsuitable for the 
production of heavy plate and could, therefore, 
produce only a limited product range. Hence, by 
itself, this technology is inappropriate for large 
scale producers who intend to produce both strip 
and plate products. These points suggest that, not 
only may the diffusion time from mini-mills 
through to large scale integrated production be 
substantial, but that even after thin slab casting 
has been adapted to large scale production there 
is likely to be a role for conventional casting 
for producers who aim to produce a range of strip 
and plate products. Of course, it is possible 
that thin slab casting technology will diffuse 
through the industry via mini-mi 11 production so 
that mini-mills capture an increasing market share 
from large integrated producers. Indeed, a 
potential danger for large scale producers arising 
from thin slab casting is that it may undermine 
the economies of scale that are gained at large 
integrated sites by competing in selected product 
markets. To be precise, if thin slab casting can 
compete effectively with continuous casting at the 
low-quality end of the market, large producers 
will have to raise prices at the high-end in order 
to protect profitability. This suggests that the 
introduction of thin slab casting may favour those 
integrated sites producing a relatively high share 
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of high-quality steels. 
As far as the quality of steel is concerned, it 
should be noted that thin slab casting suffers 
from a number of drawbacks. Firstly, the larger 
surface area of thin slab implies that products 
produced from thin slab have lower surface quality 
as compared with conventional slab. Second, the 
greater thickness of conventional slab implies 
that the surface of the slab remains flatter 
following any perturbation to the flow of steel. 
As Reynolds and Distington (1990, p. 45) point 
out, 
"Considering that mould meniscus level stability 
is the fundamental parameter for good surface 
quality this represents a significant barrier for 
near net shape technology to overcome." 
Finally, as long as the technology is dependent on 
scrap-fed electric arc furnaces it will only 
produce low quality steel. The use of low residual 
scrap improves the quality of steel produced in 
electric-arc furnaces but does not result in 
quality products that can compete with top of the 
range standards attainable from conventional steel 
production methods. Moreover, in Europe the 
comparative scarcity (vis-a-vis the USA) of low 
residual scrap may significantly reduce the 
potential cost advantages of thin slab casting in 
mini-mills. If this is the case then large scale 
producers in Europe may be afforded some 
protection from the threat of low cost entry that 
the mini-mill and thin slab casting poses. Taken 
together, these factors tend to limit the present 
applicability of thin slab casting, particularly 
in the case of Scottish steel production which has 
a reputation for high quality, high value added 
products. 
It should also be noted that there are several 
impending innovations in continuous casting 
techniques which will weaken the ability of thin 
slab casting to penetrate even the low-quality end 
of the market. Reynolds and Distington (1990) 
point to a number of factors that can be expected 
to significantly improve the efficiency of 
conventional casting and thus make it more 
difficult for mini-mills and thin slab casting to 
compete. To begin with, increased throughput can 
be achieved by increasing the reliability of 
conventional casters via the introduction of 
improved fault detection systems. This would have 
the effect of reducing 'down time' and increasing 
the maximum speed of conventional casting above 
its existing limit of 5 tonnes per minute, 
compared with the current maximum for thin slab 
casting of 2 tonnes per minute. Second, greater 
flexibility and efficiency can be attained from 
conventional casting via the introduction of three 
process innovations: width adjustment, combination 
casting and link casting. Width adjustment 
permits the production of different widths of 
steel from a single strand, thus reducing the down 
time necessary for mould changes. As Reynolds and 
Distington (1990, p. 45) point out, 
"An equivalent process has not yet been derived 
for thin slab casting because of the difficulty of 
buckling when deforming a thin edge." 
Similarly, combination casting facilitates 
increases in product range by allowing the 
simultaneous production of "narrow slabs or blooms 
down a slab strand" (Reynolds and Distington 
(1990)). 
Link casting allows the production of different 
grades of steel in a single strand. Again, the 
main advantage of this innovation is the reduction 
in down time and the consequent increase in 
productivity. This point has been neglected by LS 
who argue that increased product differentiation 
and demand for specific types of steel will "make 
it difficult for steel makers to structure 
throughput in order to generate long production 
runs." The application of link casting is 
particularly suited to Ravenscraig where the small 
size of the converters implies that this site 
could make significant efficiency gains by 
tailoring its output to a market that is becoming 
increasingly specialised and fragmented. 
To summarise, LS's arguments regarding 
technological innovation and thin slab casting 
appear to be deficient in a number of respects. 
Firstly, they have failed to provide a detailed 
assessment of the likely diffusion time for the 
innovation. Second, they have paid insufficient 
attention to the limitations on product range and 
quality and finally, they have emphasised new 
technology only as it applies to thin slab casting 
and have ignored important process innovations 
that are applicable to conventional casting. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, their conclusion that 
thin slab casting "could call into question the 
wisdom of the current wave of modernisation of 
traditional strip mills." is at odds with the 
views of leading steel analysts. For example, a 
recent editorial in Metal Bulletin Monthly 
91 
(January 1990 p. 7) argues that whilst thin slab 
casting represents a major innovation, 
"What perhaps has been lacking is a sense of 
perspective on this development, for remember 
"conventional" casting, which has done so much for 
the advance of the steel industry, can not only 
cast a very wide range of steels, but is not 
confined to flat products and has a significantly 
higher production rate. It is in absolutely no 
danger of being totally eclipsed." 
3.1.2 Direct Reduction/Smelting Reduction 
Similar points can be made in relation to the 
process of direct reduction or smelting reduction. 
Both of these terms refer to process innovations 
which will by-pass the normal blast furnace-basic 
oxygen converter route. This, of course, would 
mean that coke-ovens and blast furnaces would no 
longer be required. A recent review of Direct 
Casting has been published in Steel Times. Amit 
Chatterjee, the R&D Director of The Tata Iron and 
Steel Co, India argues that direct reduction has 
'..not lived up to its early promise' in terms of 
cost and in terms of inherent limitations in coal-
based direct reduction which make it unsuitable 
for producing high-quality products. He argues 
that smelting reduction has more potential. 
However, there is, so far, only one smelting 
reduction plant in commercial operation. The 
Corex plant commissioned by Iscor (South Africa) 
has been producing 300,000 tons per annum since 
1989. 
6 
The most commonly-held view in the industry 
appears to be that although the smelting reduction 
process avoids the high investment costs and 
environmental problems caused by the use of coke-
ovens and blast-furnaces, it is by no means an 
adequate replacement at this time. Indeed, it may 
well be that the industry will choose to adapt the 
traditional route to suit changing economic 
circumstances. Developments such as the injection 
of coke and coal into the tuyeres, the use of 
plasma devices to decrease coke rate, and the use 
of high quality lumps ores to decrease 
agglomeration costs are proceeding apace. These 
developments would appear to guarantee a future 
for the traditional blast-furnace route beyond 
that suggested by LS. 
3.2 Strategic Considerations 
The introduction of new technology also poses a 
problem for BS in a strategic sense. Even if new 
technologies offer clear long-term advantages, a 
large monopolistic producer will not rush to 
introduce these lest its existing investment is 
rendered obsolete. Rather, it will plan to 
gradually replace existing capacity with new 
capacity. These plans are only likely to be upset 
if new entrants reduce profitability in key 
markets. Given that mini-mills require less 
capital investment than todays dominant 
technology, there is an argument that BS now faces 
a greater threat of competition due to this 
potential reduction in minimum efficient scale. 
We have already argued that these mills will tend 
to compete at the lower end of the product range. 
As far as BS is concerned, the loss of 
profitability on low-grade products could also 
jeopardise the rest of its product range since 
large-scale integrated producers cannot 
concentrate solely on high-grade products. As 
mentioned above, however, the existing producers 
can attempt to ward off potential competition by 
introducing process improvements in the blast-
furnace/concast technology. 
However, this is not the only form of defence 
which is available to BS. It can seek to protect 
its markets by extending its control over steel 
distribution. Already a very strong force in UK 
steel stockholding, BS is in a position to squeeze 
potential competitors by restricting their access 
to steel users. It may also attempt to stave off 
competition by entering into long-term contracts 
with large purchasers of steel. Finally, while 
the reduction in minimum efficient scale is an 
advantage to potential new steel producers, it is 
also a disadvantage in that the capital required 
to mount a predatory bid is much less than would 
be the case for a large scale integrated producer. 
Thus, new entrants relying on mini-mill technology 
would always be vulnerable to takeover by a 
profitable large-scale producer who wished to 
retain control over the market. 
Thus, not only are there technological grounds for 
believing that the advent of new techniques of 
slab casting and direct reduction will not be as 
immediate or as dramatic as LS suggest, there are 
also reasons to believe that BS will try to 
protect its existing capital base by strategic 
action in the steel and capital markets. 
A. Conclusion 
In this paper we have attempted to deal with the 
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criticisms made by LS with regard to new 
technological developments. We have demonstrated 
that the track record of the processes which LS 
mentioned in their review is not a long or a 
particularly successful one at this stage. In 
addition there are clearly problems associated 
with the introduction of these processes even in 
the unlikely case that there are no competing 
developments in existing technology. It is 
difficult therefore to take seriously the claims 
of LS especially in view of the fact that they 
have not presented any costings nor have they 
considered on-going adaptations of existing 
technology. In any event, their proposals are 
certainly too vague a foundation on which to base 
a survival strategy for the Scottish steel 
industry. 
Footnotes 
1. Published in February 1990. 
2. Love J and Stevens J (1990) "Steel Production 
in Scotland: Strategic Considerations for the 
1990s - A Review", Quarterly Economic 
Commentary. 
3. For a description of these plants see 
"Continuous Casting" in Metal Bulletin 
Monthly, January 1990. 
4. T Reynolds and D Distington "What Future 
'Conventional' Casting?", Metal Bulletin 
Monthly, January 1990. 
5. "Beyond the blast furnace; OR and smelting 
reduction technologies", Steel Times 
International, July 1989. 
6. Steel Times International, various issues. 
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APPENDIX 
There are a number of other points made in the 
review which are of a political nature and which 
relate to the campaigning strategy of the 
'Scottish steel lobby'. It is not our job as 
economists to comment on these matters and we were 
not asked to do so by the commissioners of our 
report. However, since one of the comments 
contains a factually Incorrect inference and 
relates to the remit which we were given by 
Strathclyde Regional Council we will respcnc 
briefly to that point. In the concluding remarks 
of the review the followi"g statement is maae:-
"In the December 1989 Commentary it was suggested 
that the previously solid Scottish Stee1 lobby has 
irretrievably fragmented, Thus the Ravenscraig 
shop stewards dia not support or co-operate with 
the body which commissioned the Glasgow research. 
It has been suggested to us that, because of this 
split, tnose commissioning tre study did not wish 
their consultants to discuss steelmaking or sfip 
making but instead to concentrate narrowly or, the 
plate mill m 'so'at'O" from the influences 
shaping the remainder of the Scottish sector." 'D_ 
70) 
In response to the first point, we would like to 
point out that we did, in fact, meet with, and had 
the co-operation of, the stewards at Ravenscraig 
both in the production of ou>" March 1988 report 
which concerned steel production and in the more 
recent report which did concentrate on c:ate 
production. It is our view that the future of 
Ravenscraig and Da'zell are closely linnet', and we 
have demonstrated this ooint m this paper. wnr 
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regard to the second point, the remit we were 
given was to look at the case for siting a single 
plate mill in Scotland. It was widely believed by 
those in the industry and by Strathclyde Regional 
Council that a decision by BS on this question was 
imminent and that any research should focus on 
this question. Hence the LS interpretation (based 
on 'suggestions' from unnamed sources) is wholly 
unwarranted. 
In any event, we regard the inclusion of these 
political points as inappropriate to an academic 
publication. The same can be said of other 
comments in the review including the criticisms of 
the campaigning strategy of the steel unions in 
the mid eighties (p 66). 
The review is also riddled with statements such as 
the following: "..these points in themselves are 
not sufficient to justify the above assertion and 
the report has been severely criticised on this 
basis" (p 65). The inclusion of such statements 
which seek to cast doubt on our conclusions 
without any further substantiation other than 
oblique reference to unnamed critics does nothing 
to further this extremely important debate and is 
a breach of academic principles. This paper has 
been concerned with the substantive economic 
points raised in the review by Love and Stevens 
and we would appeal for any further debate to be 
conducted in a more academic spirit. 
A final point concerns the suitability of 
Hunterston as a site for developing the new 
technology which LS describe. We acknowledge that 
the Scottish steel industry would now be able to 
argue a stronger case for the retention of 
existing capacity if Hunterston, rather than 
Ravenscraig, had been developed as the centre of 
Scottish steel production. However, while this 
decision is a matter of regret, it does not follow 
that Hunterston is an ideal site for developing a 
mini-mill. Hunterston's outstanding natural 
advantage is its deep-water facility. However, 
the tonnages involved in mini-mill production are 
not large enough to effectively make use of this 
advantage. There are many other sites around the 
coast of the UK which would be at least as well 
suited to the establishment of a mini-mill as 
Hunterston. For example, Invergordon has 
excellent port facilities, experience of metals 
production using electrolytic techniques and is 
better sited for the European market than 
Hunterston. Further, the port facilities at 
Invergordon are not controlled by BS. A mini-mill 
producer at Invergordon would not have the problem 
of gaining access to port facilities controlled by 
its greatest potential rival. 
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